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Abstract: Broadcasting policy has traditionally been supported by a 'command-and-
control' system of assigning frequencies for terrestrial transmission, but this link is being 
eroded by the emergence of other technologies – cable, satellite, IPTV, mobile 
broadcasting - and by the emergence of multi-channel television, which is facilitated by 
digital terrestrial television.  The switch off of analogue terrestrial transmission is being 
achieved through significant government intervention, but with diverse intentions relating 
to the use of the freed spectrum.  It is argued, however, that the trend to liberalise 
spectrum policy is strong, and that this will promote the liberalisation of broadcasting. 
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istorically, broadcasting relied exclusively on spectrum, which fell 
under the control of public agencies, and was itself in Europe 
particularly heavily controlled by governments, through public 
ownership of broadcasters, limitation on entry and supervision of content 1. 
Before the explosion of spectrum-using technologies of the last 20 years, 
shortage of frequencies often acted as an alibi used to stop the development 
of new services, usually with the enthusiastic support of existing 
broadcasters. 
 H
That era is now decisively ended, through the interaction of several 
simultaneous changes. 
• New convergent platforms are now in place that deliver broadcasts 
using a range of technologies: analogue and digital terrestrial, satellite, cable 
and ADSL using telecommunications companies' copper wires; the latter two 
                     
1 This paper will focus on video entertainment (i.e. TV) although a discussion of audio (i.e. 
radio) would have similar features,  except that it would be writ smaller (and later).  That is to 
say, close control of radio via regulation and command and control spectrum policy survived the 
advent of television.  As with digital television radio is now expanding, according to competitive 
standards, but discussion of a radio 'digital switchover' is much less well advanced. 
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do not use frequencies in the conventional sense (although their emissions 
can cause interference problems). 
• The variety of services has exploded from the handful available twenty 
years age to a multi-channel world that supports itself not only through 
government or licence-fee payments and advertising (the old methods), but 
also through pay services; moreover, viewers can buy services 'on demand' 
and avoid advertising material through personal video recorders. 
• The growth of mobile or, more generally, wireless communications 
has demonstrated the value of the spectrum for which those services 
compete with broadcasting; this has created pressures to switch terrestrial 
broadcasting from analogue to digital technologies, which are about five 
times more efficient in their spectrum use. In the longer term, it may lead to 
the abandonment of terrestrial broadcasting completely, in favour of wire-
based networks and satellite distribution, which uses less valuable spectrum 
and is less expensive over wide areas. 
This article traces the interaction between spectrum management and 
these factors, firstly by reviewing spectrum management techniques applied 
to broadcasting, and then developments in transmission technology, 
especially digital switchover. 
  Spectrum management and broadcasting:  
past and present  
Public policy in the field of spectrum allocation has exercised a powerful 
influence on broadcasting. Governments used their power to assign 
spectrum as an auxiliary instrument for controlling the number and identity of 
broadcasters. Traditional spectrum management techniques suited this 
purpose very well. 
These techniques are known as 'command and control' and have 
operated in essentially the same way since the first global convention for co-
ordinating spectrum use in 1906. Under the system, spectrum blocks are 
allocated through international agreement (global or regional) to broadly 
defined services. National spectrum regulatory authorities (traditionally 
government departments, now increasingly independent agencies) 
subsequently assign licences for use of specific frequencies within these 
allocations within their jurisdictions (CAVE, 2002, p. 55). 
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This regulatory task involved an inherently complex balancing act in a 
range of dimensions, in each of which there are many conflicting 
considerations. Key factors included: 
Interference  
Transmissions interfere with one another unless sufficiently separated in 
terms of frequency, geography and time. Regulators must strike a balance 
between reducing the extent of harmful interference, through careful 
planning, and enabling new and potentially valuable new services to enter 
the market. 
International co-ordination 
The effective use of radio spectrum in one country will typically require 
careful co-ordination with neighbouring countries, to mitigate the extent of 
harmful interference.   
Investment in equipment 
Most radio equipment can operate over only a limited range of 
frequencies, and so relies on predictable access over time to defined 
frequency bands. Stability in spectrum assignments to encourage 
investment in equipment can slow the place of spectrum re-use. 
Increasingly, technical specifications are agreed internationally to reap 
economies of scale in production. Spectrum regulators need to balance 
stability and international harmonisation with responsiveness to new 
technologies. 
The problems of co-ordinating broadcasting spectrum are particularly 
severe, since broadcasting is a 'one-to-many' communications technology, 
which is efficiently done with high power over a large area. This inevitably 
creates the risk of interference with broadcasters in neighbouring areas or 
countries. This problem was vividly exposed in the United States in the 
1920s when a Court ruling denied the Government the power to control 
access to spectrum. The resulting free-for-all, in which radio stations 
progressively turned up their power to resist interference from others, led to 
a 'Tower of Babel' and eventually to the Radio Act 1927, which gave the 
Secretary of Commerce power to authorise and control access to spectrum. 
The resulting problems are resolved in the age of television broadcasting 
by international agreements, which set out in great detail which transmission 
at what power are permissible from which specified sites. Thus analogue 
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terrestrial television broadcasting in Europe is governed by agreements 
reached in Stockholm in 1961. An equivalent plan for digital television 
broadcasting in currently being developed for approval at a Regional Radio 
Conference (RRC) in Geneva in 2006.  
Subject to these constraints, each national spectrum authority assigns 
frequencies to particular broadcasters. In the United Kingdom, for example, 
analogue and digital terrestrial TV transmissions currently use 368 MHz of 
spectrum within the band 470-854 MHz. The spectrum is split into 46 
frequency channels, each composed of 8 MHz of spectrum. The following 
bands are used: 
- 470 to 590 MHz (channels 21 to 35), 
- 598 to 606 MHz (channel 37), 
- 614 to 854 MHz (channels 39 to 68). 
(To complicate matters, channel 36 is allocated to radar for historical 
reasons.)  Each channel can be used to broadcast either one analogue TV 
service, or one digital multiplex – carrying six or more separate TV services 
– from a given transmission site. There is a maximum of 11 channels used 
at a transmission site (five for analogue TV channels, and six for DTT 
multiplexes). At such sites there are still seemingly 35 frequencies (46 minus 
11) lying idle. These empty frequencies are interleaved with the frequencies 
used for the analogue and digital services. Some of the empty interleaved 
frequencies channels cannot be used because they would cause 
interference with the channels that are used or with adjacent transmitters; 
some, however, could be made available to broadcasters or other users. 
Satellite broadcasting also requires spectrum for two purposes – to uplift 
signals to the satellites and to broadcast signals direct to home (DTH). As 
signal strength from the medium-powered satellites currently in use if fairly 
low, frequencies must be cleared of alternative services to allow signals to 
'get through'. A further feature of satellite broadcasting is that, because 
transponders have a multinational footprint, and because uplift and reception 
can be in different countries, the spectrum authority in the country where the 
signal is received may have no jurisdiction over the provider of transmission 
services. 
While command and control has been used almost universally for 
managing broadcasting frequencies as well as others, attention has turned 
in several countries to the alternative of using market mechanisms to 
allocate and assign spectrum. A start has been made in this process with the 
use of auctions to assign licences, especially for  third generation mobile 
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services, but the market agenda extends to 'secondary trading,' namely the 
exchange of ownership of spectrum or spectrum licences that have already 
been issued, accompanied by the opportunity for the existing or new licence 
to change the use of the spectrum – often known as liberalisation, subject, of 
course, to international obligations. The U.S. and UK spectrum management 
agencies have supported, and to some degree introduced, secondary 
trading and liberalisation (FCC, 2002; Ofcom, 2005a). The European 
Commission recently proposed that all spectrum used for terrestrial 
broadcasting and fixed and mobile wireless communications should be 
tradable and flexible. (EC, 2005a). This is being realised particularly through 
a policy known as WAPECS (wireless access policy for electronic 
communications services, a Commission Communication on which is 
expected in mid 2006 (RSPG, 2006). 
The implications of this policy (which currently has, at best, minority 
support from the member states) would be major. It would mean that a 
substantial swathe of frequencies would be available for a range of possible 
uses. As well as mobile telephony, these include mobile broadcasting and 
wireless broadband, both 'broadcasting' technologies providing 
'broadcasting' services, but in a non-traditional form. 
Mobile broadcasting has had several trials in Europe and elsewhere, but 
fully fledged commercial services are still in their infancy 2. Given the small 
screen high levels of definition are not required, so that, roughly speaking, 
the spectrum for one terrestrial channel can transmit three services. It is not 
known yet which frequencies are best suited for mobile broadcasting, across 
a range which, in the UK, includes spectrum used for digital audio 
broadcasting (in which BT, Microsoft and others are developing a wholesale 
mobile broadcasting service), the so-called L-band at 1452-1492 MHz 
(which the UK spectrum regulator, Ofcom proposes to auction in 2007), and 
spectrum freed by the analogue broadcasting switchoff described below. A 
similar range of technological opportunities applies in other countries.   
The European Commissioner for the Information Society and 
Broadcasting has noted the development of plans for mobile broadcasting in 
a number of countries and suggested that action might be needed to make 
reception available within the EU as a whole (REDING, 2006). However, the 
discussion above suggests that it may be premature to seek either to 
                     
2 The European Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) is preparing an opinion for the 
European Commission on spectrum for mobile multimedia services in the field of broadcasting.  
The RSPG is a group of national spectrum regulators that advises the Commission. 
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standardise the technology or  to harmonise spectrum allocations for mobile 
broadcasting. 
Wireless communications technologies such as 3G (developed to higher 
speeds via HDSPA), fixed CDMA and Wi-Max are also capable of 
downloading or streaming broadcasts to individual (mobile or fixed) 
customers. This point-to-point technology is inherently more expensive than 
point-to-multi-point broadcasting technologies, but services are now or will 
soon be available. 
In the face of these competing claims on spectrum should spectrum 
regulators (government departments on independent agencies) adopt an 
administrative or command and control approach, or should they allow the 
market to decide via auctioning of spectrum among competing users and 
uses, and secondary trading with flexible use? The Commission's proposals 
are set out above. But the UK has already opted for a predominantly market-
based regime.  
As in other countries, in the UK broadcasting policy generally drove 
spectrum allocation rather than vice versa. Channels were added as and 
when broadcasting policy dictated, despite the availability of extra spectrum. 
The emergence of digital terrestrial transmission has been highly directed 
process. The only significant departure was the 'unauthorised' emergence in 
1988 of direct to home (DTH) broadcaster Sky, which used a Luxembourg-
based satellite and did not initially require a broadcasting licence from the 
regulator or a wireless telegraphy licence from the UK Government. But 
following the merger with its 'approved' rival BSB, BSkyB too came into the 
regulatory fold. 
Highly detailed planning of broadcasting frequencies was undertaken by 
the broadcasters themselves or their regulators. This has led to what is 
recognised as efficient outcomes, in the sense that the spectrum was used 
intensively, but complaints abounded over its distribution among different 
broadcasters. The regime also lacked any mechanism as to how to deal with 
issues of the assignment of more spectrum, except with traditional means 3. 
                     
3 Market mechanisms had been used previously in the UK to allocate commercial broadcast 
licences via a competitive tendering process. The object competed for was not a spectrum 
licence alone, but a package involving both favoured access to viewers and the availability of 
spectrum, conditional to the performance of specified public service broadcasting obligations. 
Thus a 'bundle' was auctioned; as a result the value of the spectrum license alone was not 
transparent. 
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Following the explicit legalisation of spectrum trading in the European 
Union in 2003 under the new regulatory arrangements, the UK 
Communications Act of 2003 placed on Ofcom, the newly integrated 
(broadcasting and telecommunications) regulator, the duty of seeking 
optimal use of spectrum, and laid the basis for the introduction of secondary 
trading and change of use of spectrum, in addition to the auctions of 
spectrum already used for primary issues.  Prior legislation had also 
permitted the spectrum agency to levy an annual payment for spectrum use 
on private or public bodies, which became known as an 'administered 
incentive price'. This was notionally designed to represent the value of the 
spectrum in an alternative use – its 'opportunity cost' – and to encourage 
economy and efficiency in spectrum use (Ofcom, 2005d). Public service 
broadcasters in particular continue to oppose what they call a 'spectrum tax'. 
Ofcom quickly developed a Spectrum Strategy Framework (Ofcom, 
2005a) and Implementation Plan (Ofcom, 2005b), together with a series of 
measures to accommodate trading. The strategy envisaged a speedy switch 
from 'command and control' to market methods, which by 2010 would 
account for 70% of assigned spectrum (see table 1), another 4-10% being 
licence exempt 4. 
Table 1 - Use of different spectrum management techniques 
a) Spectrum below 3GHz 
 Command & Control The Market Licence Exempt 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
95.8% 
95.8% 
68.8% 
22.1% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
27.1% 
73.7% 
4.2% 
4.2% 
4.2% 
4.2% 
b)  Spectrum between 3GHz and 60GHz 
 Command & Control The Market Licence Exempt 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
95.6% 
95.3% 
30.68% 
21.1% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
61.3% 
69.3% 
4.4% 
4.7% 
8.2% 
9.6% 
Source: Ofcom (2005a) p. 36 
The UK is clearly an extreme case, where tradability of spectrum will 
extend to public sector uses (such as additional spectrum required for the 
emergency services) in the future. Other administrations may nevertheless 
                     
4 Licence exempt spectrum can be used by anyone abiding by power restrictions.  Wi-fi 'hot 
spots' are a good example of current licence exempt use. Due to the interference problems 
noted above, licence exempt spectrum is not suitable for wide area broadcasting. 
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find it increasingly difficult to arbitrate not between competing firms 
producing the same service, but between competing users providing quite 
different services. The trend of spectrum management more generally is 
likely to favour market methods. This is now discussed in relation to the 
transition from analogue to digital terrestrial broadcasting. 
  Digital switchover 
The key spectrum issue facing broadcasters in 2006 involves proposals 
to switch off analogue transmission and move to digital technologies. Each 
of terrestrial, satellite and cable transmission modes can be realised in both 
analogue and digital formats, but in the latter two cases, the technological 
choice resides almost exclusively with the platform owner. However, 
because analogue terrestrial has been responsible for the universal service 
delivery of television to viewers without access to other platforms, the switch 
to digital terrestrial transmission has been the product of a complicated 
interaction of public policy, regulation and commercial incentives. As well as 
expanded capacity, digital transmission offers other advantages such as 
much greater interactivity. 
Table 2 - Digital TV penetration rates (% of households)  
in a number of countries, end 2005 
 Total Cable Satellite DTT IPTV(*) 
UK 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Spain 
Sweden 
USA 
Japan 
68.9 
34.7 
28.9 
36.0 
11.4 
17.9 
27.6 
44.5 
50.3 
59.1 
10.5 
4.3 
6.7 
0.0 
5.3 
0.4 
5.6 
9.6 
25.3 
7.2 
32.0 
21.6 
17.8 
20.2 
3.1 
17.5 
15.4 
20.6 
24.2 
33.1 
25.2 
6.9 
4.2 
14.9 
2.3 
0.0 
5.2 
13.3 
0.5 
17.9 
0.2 
1.9 
0.1 
0.9 
0.6 
0.0 
1.5 
1.0 
0.3 
0.9 
(*) Delivered by DSL or equivalent technology 
Source: Screen Digest 
This particular form of digital switchover (or digital transition or analogue 
switchoff) is occurring or planned all over the world. Thus Japan has set a 
switch-over date of 2011. Legislation has recently been passed in the U.S. 
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requiring analogue switch-off on 17 February 2009 5. Some data on the 
penetration rates of digital TV in a number of countries are given in table 2. 
In Europe, the European Union has adopted a target date of 2012 and a 
final date of 2015  for completion of the switchoff on analogue terrestrial, but 
member states have in many cases adopted more exacting targets (see 
table 3). 
Table 3 - European digital switchover timetables for terrestrial transmission 
Country Target Date Other details 
 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Malta 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
 
2010 
2012 
no date set 
2017 
2011 
2012 
2007 
2010 
2008 
2010 
2012 
no date 
2006 
2006 
2012 
no date set 
no date set 
no date set 
2014 
2010 
2012 
2015 
2010 
2008 
2008-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
No decision yet 
 
Aug 07 – all of  country 
 
Berlin switched off 2003. 
 
 
No decision yet 
 
 
SO starting in 2012 
Market to decide 
No decision yet 
 
 
No decision yet 
 
2012 target 
May start earlier by region 
In progress 
Region-by-region 
Source: European Union May 2005, partially updated April 2006 
Germany achieved the first regional switchover in 2003, in Berlin, a 
heavily-cabled area. In mid 2006 switchover was half completed and the 
target date of 2010 seems attainable. France has now set 2010 as the 
switchover date. Italy has now delayed the switch-over target to 31 
December 2006, but this is quite impracticable. Finland has a completion 
date of August 2007, and Sweden of 2008, with a 50% target by the end of 
2006. Experiences in the UK are discussed below. 
                     
5 For further analysis of developments through the world, see CAVE & NAKAMURA (2006). 
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One consequence of the switchover to digital terrestrial is that, for a 
transitional period, both analogue and digital platforms have to be used at 
once. The length of the period is under government control, but the turnover 
of customer premises equipment – televisions, VCRs, etc. – of which there 
may be three or more per household – is a slow process, and provision may 
have to be made to encourage the acquisition of digital set top boxes by 
slow adopters. In Italy, which has a switch over target date (almost certainly 
unrealistic) of the end of 2006, the government is offering set top box 
subsidies of 40 euros per household, effectively restricted to DTT boxes – 
which has led to charges of illegal state aid. 
Nonetheless, the possible 'spectrum dividend' associated with analogue 
switch-off has encouraged most governments of richer countries to seek a 
digital switchover of terrestrial transmission, which both brings the 
advantages of digital television (more channels, interactivity) and releases 
valuable spectrum that can be assigned to other users, either by command 
and control or market methods 6.  
But some obstacles have to be overcome before alternative uses can be 
implemented. In particular, the Geneva RRC of May/June 2006 (or a 
subsequent authorised meeting) must agree that released spectrum can be 
used for other purposes than broadcasting. If such alternative uses are 
authorized, it will be on the footing that this may not cause more interference 
than broadcasting, and would receive no more protection from interference 
than broadcasting. 
The European Commission has solicited from an opinion on the EU 
spectrum policy implications of the digital dividend the Radio Spectrum 
Policy Group (RSPG) 7. This follows its May 2005 Communication, which 
sets out the Community policy objectives for the transition and notes that it is 
important not to unduly constrain the re-use of the freed bands for new and 
innovative services (EC, 2005b). 
Debate in the UK has been particularly intense as a result of the 
legislative obligation in the Communications Act 2003 to ensure that digital 
coverage will replicate that attained by analogue transmission, and by the 
conflicting interests of broadcasters, many of whom, including the pay 
                     
6 Some estimates of the value of free spectrum in Europe can be found in HAZLETT et al 
(2006). 
7 See footnote 2. 
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satellite broadcaster BSkyB and analogue channels that currently face 
competition in respect of some households only from four other analogue 
channels, are likely to be adversely affected by DTT. The UK  had also 
achieved the highest levels of digital penetration in Europe by mid-2006 
(over 70%), especially of DTT in the form of Freeview, comprising of forty 
channels, largely non-pay. This favourable background for a switch-over 
followed a lengthy debate, which began in September 1999 when the UK  
government first announced its ambition to switch off the analogue TV signal 
and move to digital transmission. It said that the digital switchover could start 
as early as 2006 and finish by 2010, although the precise date would 
depend on the behaviour of broadcasters, manufacturers and consumers. 
The government also announced that switchover would not take place 
unless the following conditions were met: 
• Everyone who could watch the main public service broadcasting 
channels in analogue form (i.e. 98.5% of households) could receive them in 
digital. 
• Switching to digital was an affordable option for the vast majority of 
the population. 
The target indicator of affordability was defined as 95% of households 
having access to digital equipment before switch-over, generally taken to 
mean that 95% of households would have adopted digital TV before 
switchover occurred. A plan soon crystallised to carry out the switch-over on 
a region-by-region basis  
The cost of converting receivers was expected to vary according to 
several factors, including: 
- the amount of digital equipment a household already has, 
- how much additional equipment the household wishes to continue to 
use after switchover, 
- their platform and equipment choices, 
- their service choices,  
- prevailing prices in the year(s) they make their purchases. 
However, as the switch-over will not be voluntary for some people and, 
for most, affordability will be a major issue, there must be some minimum, 
one-off cost with which consumers feel comfortable. The cost of conversion 
for a house with only one TV where a new aerial is not required is estimated 
at EUR 60-110, while the cost for a house with two TVs and one VCR may 
be as high as EUR 110-220. 
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In research commissioned by the government, most households without 
digital TV said they were likely to convert of their own accord within the next 
few years. However, this left some 20% of households who currently intend 
to remain analogue only. Independently of whether they could receive a DTT 
signal, three-quarters of this group said they would adopt digital if they knew 
switch-over was imminent, while the remaining quarter (5% of all 
households) said they would never be willing to convert.  
The group least willing to convert to digital TV was not a coherent cluster 
with clearly defined socio-economic or demographic characteristics.  Instead 
it tended to have a variety of reasons for remaining with analogue TV. A 
household's propensity to adopt digital television frequently reflected its 
attitudes towards TV and multichannel TV in particular. Consumers least 
willing to adopt digital television tended not to value TV as a medium, or 
alternatively felt that more TV channels would have a negative impact on 
society. Some others believed that digital TV had little to offer over and 
above the analogue TV offering; while some mentioned issues such as cost 
and difficulty of use. 
In accordance with normal practice, the UK Government presented a 
justification of the switchover policy in the form of a cost-benefit analysis 
(DTI, 2005). The analysis evaluates the costs and benefits to the UK of 
completing a digital switchover involving the switch-off of all analogue 
signals. This scenario is compared with continuing both the analogue and 
digital transmissions. The analysis focuses on the quantifiable effects of 
switchover, including environmental effects. The non-quantifiable effects of 
switchover such as the public service aspects of the DTV project are not 
discussed and the distributional aspects of the project are not examined in 
detail. 
The consumer costs of switchover include the net cost of set conversion, 
which will be achieved by purchasing a set top box (STB). However, the 
aggregate cost of purchasing STBs overestimates the economic cost of 
switchover, as some of these consumers will have been very close to buying 
into digital, even if the switchover were not to take place, i.e. they value 
digital TV at some level between the cost of the STB and zero. To model 
this, it has been assumed that the implicit demand curve for STBs is a 
straight line from the cost of as STB to zero, and therefore the average 
valuation by consumers is half the cost of the STB. 
One of the key consumer benefits associated with switchover is the value 
of increased DTT coverage to previously un-served areas, areas that it was 
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impossible to reach using digital signals during dual transmission. 
Consumers will also benefit from the release of fourteen channels of clear 
spectrum when analogue transmission ceases. The economic value of this 
extra spectrum depends on the use to which it is put: generally it is 
estimated that it will be of more value if it is used for mobile 
telecommunications rather than television. However, because of risks and 
uncertainties associated with the use of using spectrum for mobile telecoms, 
the cost-benefit analysis is based on the assumption that the released 
spectrum is used for digital television services. 
The key producer benefit from switchover is the cost saving from 
decommissioning analogue transmitters, as the cost of running, maintaining 
and fuelling such sites will no longer have to be borne. It is assumed that 
any producer surplus arising for the operators of the new services on 
released spectrum will be competed away. 
The cost-benefit analysis shows quantifiable benefits in the region of £1.1 
– £2.25 billion in net present value (NPV) terms 8. Sensitivity analysis gives 
results that are reduced under some assumptions, but remaining 
substantially positive under most likely combinations of assumptions. The 
model shows that the outcome in terms of NPV is most sensitive to 
estimates of the value of extended coverage of DTT services and released 
spectrum. 
The UK government has taken on a commitment to ensure a level of 
coverage of public service broadcast signals equivalent to that currently 
available with analogue broadcasting. However, this could be achieved by 
various means: by directly mandating public service broadcasters to transmit 
in particular ways, or indirectly by placing enforceable burden on relevant 
broadcasters to meet a specified availability target, in whatever way they 
chose; the latter approach would contemplate the possibility of a variety of 
technologies being employed to provide coverage - DTT, cable, satellite, 
DSL and other technologies. Broadcasters with a universal coverage 
obligation would have an incentive to seek out the cheapest combination 
from a commercial standpoint. Such harnessing of incentives has clear 
advantages. Moreover, any preference for a single platform inspired by 
                     
8 The NPV is the capital sum available today which is equivalent to the expected stream of net 
benefits. 
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regulator or government would, if accompanied by explicit or implicit state 
subsidies, raise issues of possible state aid 9.  
Following a lengthy consultation, Ofcom finally decided to mandate DTT 
as the means of providing universal digital coverage for public service 
broadcasting multiplexes, although commercial multiplexes were free to 
make their own choices, so long as coverage did not decrease (Ofcom, 
2005c). Even this prescriptive solution left open a number of trade-offs 
among the objectives of a) coverage (raising the level by small amounts) 
above the current 98.5% available using digital technologies, b) power levels 
(which determine the number of channels available or a particular multiplex), 
c) the cost of additional transmitters, and d) the risk that the option adopted 
would be subject to delays. The variant that emerged victorious in 2005 was 
one which allowed more channels to be broadcast by using a particular 
mode of operation (known as 64QAM).  
This means that, as digital switch over progressively occurs throughout 
the UK regions, analogue transmitters will fall silent at each of the current 
1154 sites. All of those sites will be used for DTT, in place of the 80 sites 
currently used, at lower power, to achieve a 70% coverage. The UK would 
thus effectively replicate its existing analogue networks, but with a six-fold 
increase in capacity. 
This leaves open the question of how the liberated spectrum will be used. 
Ofcom has established a digital dividend review (DDR) review to investigate 
stake-holders' views and to establish a methodology for valuing alternative 
applications. Its starting point is that auctioning the spectrum for flexible use 
is the most likely way forward, but other considerations could override this. 
UK broadcasters, however, would prefer an allocation of the freed spectrum 
to them, which would support two or more national digital multiplexes in 
addition to the six already in operation. Proposals have been put forward to 
use the additional spectrum for high definition television (HDTV), which 
requires approximately four times as much spectrum as normal definition 
broadcasts. As a result of these requirements, the released spectrum would 
support only a handful of HDTV services, and it seems more efficient to 
provide such services using the less expensive spectrum utilised by satellite 
broadcasting, or by cable or DSL. 
                     
9 This is a particular danger following the Altmark case, in which the European Court specified a 
need for competitive tendering to be used where possible to finance projects with public 
subsidies. Note that the Commission concluded that the switch-over accomplished in Berlin 
involved state aid, because of its lack of technological neutrality. 
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The UK debates are of particular interest because the government and 
regulator have both sought to bring out both the economic effects of switch-
over and been faced with the problem of replicating existing high analogue 
coverage levels. The degree of legal constraint on use of the spectrum has 
been low, although this partly depends on decisions made at the 2006 
Regional Radio Conference in Geneva. 
In other member states, the spectrum regulator's freedom of manoeuvre 
is much lower. This applies, for example, in France and Germany, where 
legislative or political commitments to maintaining broadcasting use have 
been much stronger than in the UK. 
  Conclusion 
The broadcasting sector is thus on a transition path from the old world, in 
which command and control allocation of spectrum and state control of 
broadcasting combined to supply a very limited range of non-competitive 
services, to one in which multiple wireless and wire-based platform supply 
competitive services - free to air and pay - delivered in traditional linear or 
non-linear fashion. 
Spectrum policy can either promote or delay these changes. In the UK, a 
liberalised spectrum policy is likely to permit new broadcasting services, 
fixed or mobile, to come to the market, provided they can outbid other users 
for the spectrum. In other countries, spectrum policy associated with 
switchover is tending to exclude competition with alternative uses. Within 
this framework, the spectrum regulator, in combination with the broadcasting 
regulator, can either promote new broadcasting competition, or assign 
released spectrum to existing broadcasters, of either the commercial or 
public service variety. Unfortunately, the political economy of broadcasting 
regulation is such that released spectrum is often given to incumbents, 
which typically have great political influence. 
This may not be enough, however, to sustain the broadcasting status 
quo. The momentum behind new services such as mobile broadcasting is 
very strong. Other frequencies spectrum released as part of the digital 
dividend can provide them. IPTV is becoming established, using DSL. Even 
conservative spectrum regulation will struggle to turn back the tide of new 
broadcasting services. 
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